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The Ecology of Cooperation: Considerations for Litter Research 
 
Claire Gellard 
Thomas E. Dickins 
Mark Coulson 
 
 
 
Summary  
This article examines the role of intertemporal choice and relative inequality, with a 
focus on how socioeconomic conditions and environmental pressures can yield differing 
cooperative strategies which impact on littering behaviour and anti-littering 
interventions. We apply a framework emerging from behavioural biology that has great 
explanatory utility and which permits researchers to consider a frequently overlooked 
element in littering, which is key variation within populations.  
 
1. Introduction 
There is often a disconnect between desired environmental change and the short-term 
costs required to deliver it.  Environmental ambitions are set at many levels (local, 
national or international) while the behaviours that will lead to change are reliant on 
individual execution. For example, reducing the amount of single-use plastics one uses 
will not result in an immediate, observable reduction of plastic waste in the Pacific gyre.  
Nonetheless, a population of individuals delivering on this behaviour will have an impact 
over the long run.  Environmental outcomes require the concerted action of individuals 
who are able to forecast change and place value on the future benefits.  
 
Kolodko and Read (2018) discussed this tension, within the context of littering 
interventions, noting that short-term goals may outcompete any distal future 
considerations and that this behavioural situation is not to be seen as necessarily 
irrational at the individual level, especially when understood as a commons dilemma 
(Hardin, 1968).  They went on to discuss a variety of nudge techniques that might be 
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used to direct behaviour toward litter reduction. In this paper we will extend the 
argument of Kolodko and Read in order to focus upon the nature and cause of 
individual differences in cooperative behaviours within commons and other settings.  
We will approach this task as behavioural biologists, rather than social scientists, and 
argue that various forms of cooperation rely on the ability to forecast future social 
benefits.  There are clear individual differences in this ability and some of those 
differences are developmental outcomes, broadly understood as a consequence of 
ecological exposures throughout lifespan.  We will present one framework for capturing 
these outcomes that has the distinct advantage of predicting variance in a wide variety 
of behavioural and somatic phenotypic expression.  This framework suggests patterning 
in littering behaviour is a function of what social scientists refer to as socioeconomic 
status.  Our argument is that socioeconomic status is a marker of ecological realities 
and is therefore a useful and relatively easily assessed proxy for ultimate causes. 
 
For the purposes of this paper we are defining littering, in broad terms, as the 
placement of an unwanted item in an area not designated for waste disposal or 
collection.  This can be actively or passively achieved (Sibley and Liu, 2003) and can 
include anything from discarding food packaging and unwanted food, through to illegal 
dumping of waste (i.e. fly-tipping). 
 
The paper is structured as follows: First, we provide an introduction to behavioural 
biology and life-history theory to explore the role of fitness-maximisation in explaining 
behavioural adaptations (Section 2). We then highlight how cooperation can emerge 
and evolve within related and non-related populations (Section 3). In Section 4 we 
discuss how inter-temporal choice and relative inequality affect discount rates which is 
crucial in stabilizing cooperative behaviour. We then discuss a number of potential 
interventions (Section 5) based on varied ecologies, before offering some concluding 
remarks (Section 6). 
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2. Behavioural biology 
Behavioural biology is primarily focused on evolutionary accounts of behaviour.  Much 
of the development of evolutionary biology was achieved through developments in 
behavioural science, with a focus on social behaviours.  This is because social 
behaviours present specific questions for evolutionary theory, and we shall discuss 
cooperation below.  To begin, however, we must outline the core theoretical 
commitments of behavioural biology (BB). 
 
As an evolutionary discipline BB is focused upon adaptations, where an adaptation is 
any trait that operates in such a way as to increase the relative frequency of its 
underlying genes within the population gene pool.  The concept of fitness captures the 
idea that organisms are vehicles that act to further the replication of the genes that built 
them (Dawkins, 1989).  Fitness is not a property of individuals, but is a modelling 
concept that enables the examination of evolutionary effects. Thus, individual fitness is 
increased directly by reproduction, such that genes are replicated and represented 
across generations and fitness is increased indirectly by the reproduction of genetic 
relatives, or kin.  Traits that increase successful direct and indirect reproduction are 
adaptations.  The sum total of fitness maximizing effort is referred to as inclusive fitness.  
Inclusive fitness theory assumes that organisms act to maximize their average lifetime 
inclusive fitness, and behaviours that do this are adaptations that have been selected 
through evolutionary time (West and Gardner, 2013).  Testing this baseline hypothesis 
is the business of BB. 
 
Behavioural adaptations introduce flexibility, or plasticity, enabling organisms to deal 
with change.  This is a key point.  Behaviour is a method of calibrating organisms to 
complex environments in a way that will enable their survival and reproduction 
(Godfrey-Smith, 1996, 2002).  Behaviours calibrate on a moment-to-moment basis, 
through learning and also through core developmental processes. 
 
A key framework for BB is life history theory, originally cast in terms of r/K selection 
(Pianka, 1970).  Both r and K are parameters in ecological equations, where r denotes 
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the reproductive growth rate of a population and K the carrying capacity.  The basic idea 
was that carrying capacity could check reproductive growth rate, but also that different 
option spaces existed for organisms within this dynamic.  Thus, in species that were 
heavily r-selected, more effort would be put into reproduction, and one would expect to 
see rapid development from birth to sexual maturity, high levels of reproduction, and 
little specialization.  In contrast, heavily K-selected populations would consist of 
organisms that were slow to develop, had relatively low rates of reproduction, and 
became niche specialists as they dispersed and moved into particular ecologies due to 
local carrying capacity constraints.  These two parameters are not, in fact, equivalent to 
one another, and life history theory repackaged these ideas in terms of fast versus slow 
life-history strategies (Stearns, 1977,1980,1992) where slow life histories enabled the 
development of specializations.  Species can be ranked in terms of the relative speed of 
their average life-histories, but within species there is also variance, indicating a variety 
of strategic options as a function of circumstances. 
 
The notion that life-histories are strategic is important.  Developing organisms are 
regarded as collecting information about their environmental circumstances and using 
this to establish rational, fitness maximizing strategies.  This is an optimality assumption 
that incorporates the notion of trade-offs.  The key trade-offs in life-history theory are 
those between current versus future reproduction and the quantity versus quality of 
offspring produced.  These trade-offs are a response to current and predicted 
resources, where resources are broadly construed to include such things as access to 
calories and nutrients through to social benefits.  At some point in development trade-off 
strategies may become fixed, but it is important to be clear about what this means.  
Recent life history theory research into age at first pregnancy in humans demonstrated 
that maternal birthweight, breast-feeding regime, and socioeconomic status were all 
predictors.  Specifically, early first pregnancies were predicted by low birthweight, 
reduced breast feeding and low socioeconomic status of the mother (Coall et al., 2011; 
Nettle et al., 2011).  Moreover, these young mothers reached sexual maturity and other 
developmental milestones sooner than their matched controls (Nettle et al., 2013).  
Socioeconomic status should be seen as capturing real, ecological facts, under this 
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model (Marmot, 2010).  To put it metaphorically, all of these predictors tell the 
developing mothers, in this case, about the relatively harsh environment they are living 
in, and investment in earlier pregnancy makes good evolutionary sense when future 
extrinsic resource is unlikely to improve and ageing effects will put offspring at risk if 
reproduction is delayed.  Thus current reproduction is favoured over future reproduction.  
Here, natural selection is seen as the rational actor, having selected for plastic 
developmental response that is sensitive to key parameters.  But the actions of the 
individuals are also rational under these contexts, as there is much evidence to suggest 
that attendant psychological processes around desire for and planning families match 
these parameters (Arai, 2009).  In this way learning and development are closely 
coupled and deliver an outcome that is fixed once delivered: in effect, the bet is taken.  
 
 
3. Cooperative behaviour 
Cooperation is a generic term that captures a number of behaviours.  Specifically, a 
cooperative behaviour will provide a benefit to another individual, and will have been 
selected for as a consequence of that benefit (Davies et al., 2012).  Within evolutionary 
biology this possibility initially presents as a problem – how could selection operate in 
order to benefit the genes (or fitness) of another individual?  Surely all selected 
behaviour must directly benefit the behaving organism? 
 
It is important to be clear about what what this question means.  In our discussion of BB 
and life-history theory we dealt with adaptations for plasticity.  The assumption was that 
those adaptations were underpinned by genes that had been selected over evolutionary 
time.  For new traits to emerge, new genetic variants must be introduced, and most 
often those are mutations of an existing gene, leading to new forms of that gene.  The 
various forms of a gene are referred to as alleles.  In most evolutionary models that try 
to understand how a new trait might emerge the question becomes one of how a new 
mutation, or allele, might go to fixation in a population, remembering that the mutation 
will arise in one individual only.  That individual has to receive some relative 
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reproductive advantage as a result of the new variant in order for that variant to thrive in 
the population. 
 
Hamilton (Hamilton, 1964) addressed the issues of cooperation first by classifying social 
behaviour in terms of actors and recipients, costs and benefits (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Hamilton’s classification of social behaviour (adapted from Davies et al. 2012:308) 
 
Effect on actor Effect on recipient  
 Positive Negative 
   
Positive Mutually beneficial Selfish 
Negative Altruistic Spiteful 
 
Mutualism makes sense as both parties benefit (though see (West et al., 2011) for 
clarity on the complexities here).  One obvious way in which altruism might emerge is if 
actors and recipients are related, thus sharing the same genetic variants (or alleles) and 
enabling direct selection.  This idea is referred to as kin selection and enables the 
stabilization of cooperation across close and more distant relatives just so long as the 
costs to the individual do not outweigh the benefits, weighted by genetic relatedness.  
Hamilton captured this in a mathematical expression, referred to as Hamilton’s Rule 
(see (Dickins, 2011)).  Under this rule spite will emerge when the recipient is less 
related to the actor than the average individual in a population.  Specifically, it will make 
sense to harm a non-relative in this way if doing so frees up resource for relatives in the 
population, thereby benefitting individuals carrying the same spiteful genes. 
 
It is not always the case that cooperating individuals are related.  To address this issue 
game theory was introduced.  Game theory focuses upon competitive interactions 
between individuals and seeks equilibrium solutions to those interactions.  These are 
behavioural strategies that cannot be outcompeted by any other strategy that might be 
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adopted within the confines of a game.  The Prisoner's Dilemma is one of the best-
known games used in evolutionary theory.  Multiple forms of this game now exist but 
originally it comprised two prisoners planning an escape.  The prison guards become 
suspicious and interrogate both prisoners individually.  There is no direct evidence of an 
escape plot, so the guards put a deal to each prisoner.  Here is how Gardiner expresses 
the deal (Gardiner, 2001): 
 
Each faces the following proposition. He can either confess or not confess.  If both confess then each 
gets five years.  If neither confesses, then each gets one year on a lesser charge.  But if one confesses 
and the other does not, then the confessor goes free, and the non-confessor gets ten years.  Neither 
knows for sure what the other will do; but each knows that the other faces the same choice situation. 
(p.391) 
 
The original version is a one-shot game where each player has only one strategic move 
that they can make: to cooperate or to defect.  Most people understand the best option 
for any prisoner in this situation is to defect and confess the plot.  If the other prisoner 
confesses too, any punishment will be relatively light compared to the worse case 
punishment of an extra ten years, if a prisoner stays quiet whilst the other confesses.  
Thus on average the best decision is to defect on your prior arrangement with the fellow 
prisoner.  This is an issue of individual rationality.  If the prisoners could confer then 
something else would emerge.  
 
In evolutionary terms the assumption is that the strategy of defection in these 
circumstances will thwart any mutation that tends to cooperation.  If we think of the 
costs in the dilemma as fitness costs, then the relative benefits of defection will stop 
cooperation genes going to fixation in a population.  Thus BB uses evolutionary game 
theory to model genetic strategies, which are cashed out in behavioural terms.  
Equilibrium solutions are referred to as Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (Maynard-Smith, 
1982). 
 
The finding that defection is a stable strategy in one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma games is 
consistent under multiple cost-benefit trade-offs (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981).  
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Defection is also a stable strategy in multiple-shot games if the number of interactions is 
known in advance. Once the last move is reached a player should defect as the last 
move is effectively a one-shot game, and this means defect will also be best on the 
penultimate move and so on all the way back to the first iteration. 
 
If the series of encounters goes on with no end in sight, or there is a possibility, however 
small that the individuals will encounter one another again at a later date, then more 
complex encounters and strategies can emerge.  This was famously tested with a 
computer contest in which scientists played their strategies against one another, against 
themselves (in ignorance) and against random defector or co-operator strategies 
(Axelrod, 1990).   There was a high probability of future encounters in this contest. The 
strategy that won, or was stable, was tit-for-tat.  Tit-for-tat co-operates on the first move 
and thereafter copies its opponent’s previous move.  Thus tit-for-tat becomes a strategy 
of co-operation based on reciprocity.  It succeeds because it is initially cooperative, but 
retaliatory, discouraging defection, and; it forgave after one retaliation, restoring 
cooperation. 
 
Tit-for-tat is a method for facultatively enforcing reciprocity (West et al., 2011).  
Reciprocity has been a key solution to cooperation between non-kin – you scratch my 
back now and at some future point I will scratch your own (Trivers, 1971).  But this 
solution is open to free riding, such that individuals could take the benefit but never 
deliver a future return.  This would clearly destabilize cooperation, and the tit-for-tat 
strategy introduced retaliatory punishment to enforce continued cooperation.  In that 
case the punishment was simply to copy any move, thus defection would be ‘rewarded’ 
with defection and over time the average benefits to all players would be driven down.  
Cooperation thus becomes rational again. 
 
Tit-for-tat, as it has been described so far, is a behavioural strategy initially implemented 
on computers.  For reciprocity to work in natural populations individuals need to be able 
to keep track of others, thereby understanding that there are probabilities attached to 
future interaction, and they need to be able to model a future pay-off.  Population 
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structure is key to reciprocity, and cooperation between non-kin, but so too are memory 
and the ability to forecast.  Where these capacities are challenged or limited then 
cooperation will not stabilize (Stephens et al., 2002; Stevens and Hauser, 2004).  This 
idea is potentially captured in the tragedy of the commons in that individual benefits 
outweigh population benefits at least in part because the population effect is more 
distal; the implication is that a littering individual is unable to appropriately model the 
future costs of accumulated litter.  The time periods between choice and outcome are 
therefore of great interest and are captured in the literature on inter-temporal choice. 
The tragedy of the commons problem is regarded as a multi-player Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game (Gardiner, 2001).  Kolodko and Read (2018) give an example of this, noting that 
at the individual level the benefits of littering can outweigh the costs of responsible 
disposal, whilst at the population level, the costs of littering can outweigh the benefits.  
In effect, a decision to litter is a decision to defect on the public good of responsible 
disposal because of perceived cost-benefit imbalance.  Kolodko and Read go on to 
discuss a series of nudge interventions that might alter these perceptions.  We shall 
return to this in section 5. 
 
 
4. Inter-temporal choice and inequality 
Imagine searching for a pen to write a birthday card.  Rifling through the kitchen drawer 
yields a cheaply produced biro, which will enable the task to be completed, but a longer 
search in one’s study might yield an expensive pen that improves one’s hand and thus 
the quality of the overall card.  Search time is a cost that must be balanced against the 
benefits of a well-crafted card.  As the card is an investment in a social relationship the 
amount of time searching for a pen is revealing of how much value the actor attaches to 
that relationship.  The situation can be packaged as this choice: a poor pen now, or a 
much better pen after x minutes of searching. 
 
Financial behaviour often provides examples and models of choices across time 
intervals – or inter-temporal choice.   Imagine being given the choice between £10 in 
two days time or £50 in two months.  Clearly the latter is financially more rewarding, but 
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the wait is much greater.  Those who choose the former might be said to be discounting 
their future more heavily than those choosing the latter option.  Indeed, a discount utility 
function could be mathematically derived from such choice behaviours to descriptively 
capture at least this instance of choice (Frederick et al., 2002). 
 
Intertemporal choice has previously been explored using the discounted utility model 
which suggests that discount rates remain constant and stable over time, that is, the 
discount rate decreases exponentially as time progresses (Streich and Levy, 2007). For 
example, if you prefer £10 today rather than £20 tomorrow, you will also prefer £100 in 
one year rather than £200 in one year and a day from now. This model predicts that 
outcome valuation is predictable over time, however, hyperbolic discounting has been 
found to be much more accurate in predicting and describing intertemporal choice 
(Frederick et al., 2002). Hyperbolic models suggest that people discount more heavily in 
the near present (e.g. today versus tomorrow) but then the discount rate is less rapid as 
time progresses (e.g. next month versus the month after next). 
 
Discounting has been studied widely in behaviours such as smoking (Reynolds et al., 
2004), substance abuse (Petry, 2001) and gambling (Dixon et al, 2003) where there is a 
preference for short term payoffs (i.e. the immediate benefits of nicotine, the release of 
endorphins from a glass of wine, or the occasional immediate payout from a slot 
machine) - this is indicative of impulsivity and seen as symptomatic of a fast-life strategy 
(Walther et al., 2012; Griskevicius et al, 2013). Smoking, substance abuse and 
gambling are also asymmetric in their socioeconomic distribution.  Lower 
socioeconomic status populations are more prone to these behaviours (Barnes et al., 
1999; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009).  Those living in situations where long-term futures 
are uncertain are more likely to heavily discount that future in favour of immediate 
gratification. What this means, is that future orientation is a highly valuable and relevant 
mechanism to consider when it comes to environmental behaviours of which payoffs 
often require a delay of gratification.  
 
Differences in discount rates can be predicted by life history theory whereby 
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preferences for delayed versus immediate rewards are influenced by mortality rates and 
resource shortage (Griskevicius et al., 2011). Griskevicius found that individuals who 
grew up relatively poor chose smaller but immediate payoffs and those who had grown 
up relatively wealthy preferred to wait for the larger future payoff, when primed with 
mortality cues. Following our preceding argument, if one’s environment is unpredictable, 
the wisest option would be to take what you can today, as tomorrow is uncertain, 
whereas if you expect to live for many years it may be worth your while investing now 
for a larger payoff in the future. 
 
As indicated above discount rate is also crucial to stabilizing cooperation and therefore 
will impact upon structured populations facing commons dilemmas.  Even in minimally 
structured interactions there should be an effect.  For example, Curry and colleagues 
(Curry et al., 2008) found that people who were more patient, as measured with a 
standard discount rate task, were more cooperative even within a one-shot public goods 
game.  The implication here is that a cooperative disposition is integrally related to an 
ability to forecast, value and invest in potentially uncertain distal pay-offs.  Indeed, 
socioeconomic status has also been related directly to levels of altruism, with poorer 
neighbourhoods demonstrating less altruistic behaviour (Holland et al., 2012; Nettle et 
al., 2011; Wilson et al., 2009). 
 
The implication here is clear.  At least in the developed world, with high levels of relative 
inequality (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009), low socioeconomic status, which captures 
exposure to health risks, shorter life spans and reduced resourcing going forward 
(Marmot, 2010), is associated with steeper discounting and lower levels of cooperation.  
Unsurprisingly, littering behaviour and attitudes toward it are also socioeconomically 
distributed such that lower socioeconomic circumstances predict more littering and less 
concern about it (Arafat et al., 2007; Eastman et al., 2013; Santos et al., 2005).  Pampel 
(2014) found that cross-culturally, higher income populations in more affluent countries 
show greater environmental concern than their low-income counterparts. In addition, 
slow life history strategists, who place more value on later rewards, may be more 
concerned with their reputation as they are more likely to attract direct and indirect 
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benefits from future parties within their social groups (Wu et al, 2017; Sylwester and 
Roberts, 2010). These findings lend themselves to the notion that littering behaviour, for 
example, is not an issue of immediate concern for those living under lower 
socioeconomic conditions as they are focused on more immediate fitness-maximizing 
endeavours.  
 
 
5. Cooperative landscapes and interventions 
Cooperation depends upon the structure of the population but also upon the ability of 
individuals to forecast and remember.  Individual differences in these abilities are a 
consequence, to some large extent, of exposures to risk and resource differentials 
across the lifespan, such that low socioeconomic conditions within developed countries 
create neighbourhoods of individuals with steep discount rates and lower levels of 
cooperation.  Low socioeconomic status is also associated with lower levels of pro-
environmental beliefs and behaviours, and this is relevant to the commons problem of 
littering.  These effects can be seen to pulse with changes in macroeconomic fortunes, 
such that periods of recession lead to greater impoverishment of neighbourhood 
environments (Allen, 2013).  Given this, we might understand the overall problem of 
littering as one that is happening across a diverse and dynamic landscape and one 
caused by a variance of ecological pressures on populations. These pressures demand 
very different priorities, and therefore very different cost-benefit trade-offs. This makes it 
unlikely that generic policies aimed at reducing littering will work uniformly well. 
 
The association between litter, and other environmental degradation, and poor life 
outcomes and quality has long been noted and discussed.  There are two leading 
causal theories.  The first is ‘broken window theory,’ which suggests that disordered 
environments signal that defection is an acceptable behavior (i.e. it is the social norm) 
and therefore individuals adjust their behavior accordingly. Additionally, visible signs of 
disorder indicate risk and unpredictability which further emphasises the need to 
prioritize immediate fitness returns.  The second argues that these things might best be 
seen as a symptom of a lack of social cohesion (O’Brien and Kauffman, 2013).  O’Brien 
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and Kauffman found that social relationships, and a greater sense of social efficacy, led 
to more prosocial behaviours irrespective of physical deterioration at the neighbourhood 
level.  We do not believe this is a coherent contrast. 
 
Not only does forecasting enable individuals to imagine future reciprocity with an 
individual presenting in the here and now, it enables the modelling of new social 
relationships.  This idea is captured by the concept of social capital, considered broadly 
as the ‘features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that 
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit’ (Putnam, 1995, p.67). Social 
capital has the ability to reduce the transactional costs of collective behaviour (Pretty 
and Ward, 2001) and facilitates interpersonal feedback opportunities by communication 
of values and behaviours. In this way culture is developed, which can act as a collective 
memory as well as a collective prescription about how to act. Neighbours can provide 
advice to others which can act to challenge previous habits and provide a frame of 
reference whereby the behavioural norm can be assessed and adjusted to better reflect 
the expected behaviour (Macias and Williams, 2016; Thoyre, 2011). Interestingly, 
people are more altruistic toward better connected individuals in a social network, 
indicating a clear understanding of social capital, or future social resource (Curry and 
Dunbar, 2011).  
 
Social capital has been linked to more engagement in pro-environmental behaviours as 
it fosters values of collective over individualistic interests (Thoyre, 2011). Differences in 
social capital have been found between contrasting socioeconomic populations, with 
more deprived populations reporting less social capital. Conversely, more affluent 
populations reported more trust in others and that they believed that their neighbours 
were more likely to look out for one another (Nettle, 2015). In other words, the more 
connected one feels to a community, the greater likelihood social cohesion can prevail 
and lead to cooperative behaviours. Research indicates that people give more in 
economic games when they are provided with information about the potential recipient, 
such as seeing them or being told their name and hobbies (Eckel and Grossman, 1996; 
Bohnet and Frey, 1999a, 1999b; Charness and Gneezy, 2008). 
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Instead of making the contrast, our claim is that risky, or uncertain futures, make 
cooperation difficult to stabilize, which in turn reduces the social capital of a population 
and makes long-term future pay-offs less likely still.  In other words, this becomes a 
vicious circle of downward degradation (as depicted in Figure 1).   
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Representation of the challenges in formulating cooperation within low socioeconomic 
populations. 
 
Acting at this point, with social interventions designed to facilitate reciprocity, has been 
found to be consistently effective (Kraft-Todd et al., 2015).  Kolodko and Read (2018) 
note that there are social and situational contexts to littering.  They claim that social 
Uncertain Future  
Low levels of 
cooperation 
Reduction of social 
capital 
High delay 
discounting 
Reduced trust 
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contexts are best dealt with through efforts to promote cooperation, including 
communication strategies, shared social values and territorialization (such that 
individuals are associated with small patches that they have some ownership over).  
Situational contexts require the development of what they refer to as ‘new paths of least 
resistance’ to the appropriate behavioural outcome.  This can amount to innovations in 
bin design and placement, or financial incentives and disincentives (or punishment), 
both of which we consider below. 
 
5.1 Bin design 
The design and placement of bins is effectively an attempt at stimulus control (Geller et 
al., 1979; O’Neill et al., 1980).  Early research in littering focused on preventative 
measures based on behaviour analytic techniques, with the basic idea being to make 
bins more salient discriminative (or controlling) stimuli that would then become attached 
to the appropriate behavioural response.  In early experiments, such as those of O’Neill 
et al. and Geller et al., information was also posted on or near to bins in order to direct 
the appropriate behavioural response.  The hope was that the response would 
generalize across bins more generally, and that the litter disposal would become 
entrained rather than discarding.  However, in order to do this effectively experimental 
procedures that presented related bin stimuli would be required, along with some kind of 
variable interval of presentation tied to a reward structure in order to avoid extinction of 
the desired response (Staddon, 2016).  This makes it likely that any bin redesign project 
will have to rely upon schedules of reward and punishment. 
 
5.2 Reward and punishment 
Rewards and punishments are used in behaviour change processess more generally.  
Fines can be effective punishments, if tied tightly to the undesired behavioural 
response, but can also be damaging in that they can exacerbate the problems facing 
low socieconomic status individuals.  Fines, as punishments, can therefore be 
overgeneralized as they impact on many aspects of life.  As such they lose their 
controlling function.  Indeed, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) found that penalties for late 
child pick-ups from day-care rendered an increase in the undesired behaviour possibly 
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because the penalty payment essentially bought them the right to do so. Rewards are a 
commonly used method to improve performance or facilitate behaviour change and can 
take different forms, such as monetary or social.  Again, they must be appropriately tied 
to the behaviour in focus. 
 
For social scientists rewards are designed to appeal to two primary motivations; intrinsic 
and extrinsic. Intrinsic motivation relates to the performance of a behaviour as a reward 
in its own right (e.g. enjoyment of the task), whereas extrinsic motivation is when the 
behaviour is performed in order to attain a reward or avoid punishment. Research has 
indicated that extrinsic rewards can have a negative effect on intrinsic motivation 
because extrinsic rewards can ‘crowd out’ any existing intrinsic motivation. Self-
determination theory (Ryan and Deci, 2000) suggests that there are three essential 
elements to consider when exploring motivation; autonomy (a need to have a choice 
and self regulation over behaviour), relatedness (a need to have close relationships with 
others) and competence (a need to interact effectively with the environment). Indeed, 
studies have shown that when monetary rewards are offered as incentives, 
performance often decreases, whereas positive verbal feedback can increase 
performance (Deci, 1971).  The concept of intrinsic motivation might best be linked to 
the concept of wanting something, as opposed to liking.  Want implies some form of 
need or requirement, whereas liking is some kind of positive response.  It is possible to 
like what one wants; but these responses are under distinct neurological control 
(Berridge et al., 2009).  Deci suggests that money, as a reward may ‘buy off’ one's 
intrinsic motivation, whereas verbal reinforcement may be interpreted as less controlling 
and foster feelings of competency (Deci, 1971 pg. 114).  This might be reinterpreted as 
money being something that is required in a second order manner – it can buy many 
things – and as such it will operate as a general solution to a general problem.  
Targetted verbal reward is more directly tied to a behavioural response, by definition, 
and if verbal reward is something that is liked then this will act as a discriminative 
stimulus far more effectively.  Financial and related reward structures are also 
problematic because they are costly and the reinforcement schedules required to 
establish a successful generalized response are not always practical (O’Neill et al., 
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1980). This suggests the possibility that a low contingency intermittent reward schedule 
(e.g. rewarding behaviour just on occasion) may render the behaviour resistant to 
extinction. 
 
5.3 Networks and social capital 
Those who cooperate are more likely to benefit from future acts of reciprocity and so 
making cooperative behaviours observable to others is one way in which cooperation 
can be sustained. Yoeli et al. (2013) applied this theory to a large-scale field experiment 
where they found that people were significantly more likely to sign up to an energy 
conservation initiative when they could be identified (as opposed to signing up with a 
generic ID code or receiving a monetary incentive). These findings indicate that social 
rewards, such as positive feedback and public recognition may be an effective and less 
costly alternative to promote pro-environmental behaviours and in addition foster 
positive feelings. 
 
Kolodko and Read (2018) in line with the majority of scholars in this field, recommend 
interventions aimed at small groups.  An expressed hope is that successful targeting of 
small groups will lead to a tipping point for the spread of pro-environmental, anti-littering 
social values, presumably mediated by social network structures and key nodes 
between groups, perhaps through some kind of contagion model (Burt, 2000).  This 
hope relies upon notions of social capital and its categorization into bonding, bridging 
and linking capital (Dahal and Adhikari, 2008).  Bonding capital applies to others one 
shares common traits with, such as family and close friends. This is related to kin 
selection (Section 2).  Social groups formed around these kinds of bonds are very 
strong and it is of interest that organizations seeking to instil high levels of costly 
cooperation often invoke fictive kin mechanisms that include uniforms for similarity of 
appearance and the adoption of kin terms such as brother and sister (Qirko, 2009).  
Bridging capital refers to the ability to form ties with those who are unlike you and this 
must rely upon an ability to buffer free-riding costs as well as an ability to model ongoing 
long-term interactions with non-kin.  Where bonding capital can help you by ‘getting 
along’ in life, bridging capital can help you by ‘getting ahead’ by providing a gateway to 
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accessing more resources (de Souza Briggs, 1997 cited in Putnam, 2000, p.23) but it is 
intrinsically risky for all the reasons discussed in Section 2. Research suggests that 
members of lower socioeconomic status have less social capital overall but bonding 
capital, specifically, can act to buffer against negative health effects (Uphoff et al., 
2013). Linking capital refers to ties with organisations or individuals where there is a 
power hierarchy and this captures links with formal institutions.  Institutions make great 
effort to bind people to trust relations via legal procedures including contracts, and 
individuals can protect themselves with insurance.  This is costly, and therefore 
excludes many, but in some ways this makes linking capital a less risky prospect than 
bridging capital. Clearly the number of individuals with different kinds of capital in any 
one social grouping will impact upon the nature of that local network, but also its 
connection to and influence over wider social networks.  More specifically, social capital 
is a property of social network structures and can directly impact upon fitness in humans 
and other primates (Hawkins and Maurer, 2010; Silk et al., 2009). 
 
As we have discussed there are limitations on the formation of social networks due to 
memory and the ability to forecast.  Thus far we have discussed this in terms of the 
ability to stabilize cooperation, but it is also entirely possible that memory limits the size 
of possible social networks too and that this has put an evolutionary limit on the size of 
our networks (Dunbar and Shultz, 2007; Hill and Dunbar, 2003).  However, a key issue 
that has yet to be considered by scholars in this field is how the nature of social 
networks changes across urban, suburban and rural communities, in line with our 
discussion of socioeconomic effects above. There is also good reason to ask how the 
nature of local facilities affects the number of strangers coming into an area and the 
opportunity to develop and maintain stable cooperative networks (Hristova et al., 2016).  
According to Hristova et al., some places act to enable bonding and others bridging, 
with large cities presenting high social entropy (or diversity) such that bridging forms of 
social brokerage are necessarily higher.  Entropy here is a measure of social instability 
such that there is a high throughput of different and new individuals.  This makes 
repeated future interactions difficult, and following the discussion in Section 2, suggests 
that cooperation will be hard to establish.  This suggests an interaction between social 
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and situational contexts such that aspects of physical geography yield social 
affordances, enabling the accumulation (or not) of social capital or particular types.  We 
would predict patterns of littering and also differences in uptake of litter interventions as 
a consequence of these distributed social capital effects. 
 
 
6. Overview 
Whilst we have been critical in our evaluations of the kinds of intervention summarized 
by Kolodko and Read (2018) we do not dispute the efficacy of the studies they cite.  
Effects have clearly been won.  What we are suggesting is that those effects deserve 
further scrutiny using the theoretical tools we have outlined above.  Idiosyncracies of 
local social networks, oddities of reinforcement around reward interventions etc. will all 
be of value if exposed.  The problem with the nudge approach is that it represents a 
pragmatic borrowing from multiple literatures without any effort to understand how or 
why interventions work.  We believe this is necessarily limiting in two ways.  First, it 
prevents thorough understanding of the problem of littering.  Second, we question the 
longevity of any effects, something that is simply never assayed.  Pragmatism is 
laudable, but time-limited pragmatism perhaps less so. 
 
This second point is most salient.  Our framework leads us to believe that littering 
behaviours are tied to a much broader fabric of social concerns and that the best way to 
address the issue of littering is to bite the political bullet and to see this as a key issue of 
inequality and a public health concern.  Clearly there are public health consequences to 
the build up of unwanted items, including food and food packaging as well as other 
pollutants.  But where you see evidence of such future discounting you also find 
stressed ecologies that have definitive morbidity and mortality consequences for their 
inhabitants.  The much publicized concerns about increases in mental health problems 
and loneliness are, we believe, linked to the issues of cooperation that we have 
discussed.  Interventions designed to build sustainable social capital in complex spaces 
like cities, but also in dispersed rural communities, will pay dividends on many fronts 
including an increased sense of custodianship of our natural environment. 
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